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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST

AMENDMENT-RELEASE OF TOLL
CALL BILLING RECORDS DISCLOSING JOURNALISTS' CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCES HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND NOT TO

REQUIRE PRIOR JUDICIAL REVIEW.

Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (D.C. Cir. 1978)
In order to prevent telephone companies I from disclosing long distance
telephone billing records to government officials 2 without judicial supervision, twelve professional journalists, 3 two newspaper publishing corporations, 4 and the Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press 5 brought
suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court
7
for the District of Columbia. 6 Specifically, plaintiffs asserted that the first
and fourth" amendments require prior notice of any governmental request
for such information in order that plaintiffs may have the opportunity to
institute proceedings to challenge the subpoenas. 9 The district court re-

1. Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d
1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1431 (1979). The defendant telephone companies
were the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T) and the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. 593 F.2d at 1036. The United States intervened as a party defendant. Id.
2. Id. at 1079 (Wright, C.J., dissenting). The government has used toll call records as an
investigative tool in tracking down contacts between the subscriber and third parties. Id. at
1036. In the journalist context, this has resulted in the disclosure of the names of various
confidential sources. Id. at 1090-91 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 1036. The journalists were Jack Anderson, Marquis W. Childs, Emmett Dedmon,
Richard Dudman, Morton Mintz, Bruce Morton, John Pierson, James R. Polk, David E.
Rosenbaum, Richard Salant, Daniel Schorr, and Frederick Taylor. Id.
4. Id. The corporations were Dow Jones & Co., Inc., and The Knight Newspaper Group of
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., Id.
5. Id. The Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press is a legal research and defense
fund organization established to protect the interests of the press. Id.
6. Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1889
(D.D.C. Aug. 17, 1976). The plaintiffs instituted this action upon the defendants' refusal to
comply with their request that the journalists be notified prior to the release of the toll call
records. 593 F.2d at 1038.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides inpertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law .. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ..... Id.
8. Id. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. The plaintiffs did not pursue their fourth amendment claim on appeal. 593 F.2d at 1082,
n.12 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1036. Prior to 1974, the Bell System had no uniform policy regarding the release
of company billing records to government officials. Id. at 1038. In 1974, AT&T adopted a formal
policy governing such releases which includes three provisions: 1) the policy prohibits the release of toll call billing records in the absence of a subpoena or summons, valid on its face,
issued under the authority of a statute, court, or legislative body; 2) the policy requires that
subscribers whose telephone billing records have been subpoenaed in civil suits, noncriminal
investigations, and nonfelony criminal investigations be immediately notified upon receipt of the
subpoena-the same day by telephone and, in addition, by letter within 24 hours; and 3) the
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jected these constitutional claims and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. ' 0
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part," holding that toll call
record subpoenas do not violate the first amendment unless they are issued
in bad faith or the plaintiff establishes that there is a clear and imminent
threat of future misconduct by the government. Reporters' Committee for
Freedom of the Press v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 593 F.2d
1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1431 (1979).
It is axiomatic that the rights conferred by the first amendment occupy
a "preferred position" among those individual liberties vested by the Constitution, 12 and any government action which may infringe upon them must
be closely scrutinized. 13 Although the official activity may be within the
proper scope of authority, the United States Supreme Court has maintained
that where the effective exercise of a first amendment right has allegedly
been abridged, the judiciary is obligated to "determine the permissibility of
the challenged actions." 14 The Court, in a series of decisions, established
various prerequisites which had to be met by the government in order to
17
overcome the broad 15 presumptive protection 16 of the first amendment.
policy requires that subscribers whose toll call records have been subpoenaed in felony investigations be similarly notified, unless the subpoena is accompanied by a written certification stating (a) that the subpoena or summons was issued pursuant to an official investigation of a suspected felony or an official legislative investigation, and (b) that notification to the subscriber
could impede the investigation. id. Such certification is effective for 90 days, but may be renewed by further certifications, in writing, for successive 90-day periods. Notification of the
subpoena to the subscriber may be effected upon expiration of these periods. Id. In practice,
however, AT&T's adoption of the new policy did not produce any substantial change in its
procedures. During the period from March 1, 1974 through June 30, 1975, government investigators sought and received 32,000 toll call records. In 90% of these cases no notice was ever
given to subscribers. Id. at 1082 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 1041.
11. Id. at 1036. The court reversed and remanded with respect to the five jounalists who
had presented evidence indicating possible governmental abuse of subpoena power. Id. at 1036,
1066. These five plaintiffs were Jack Anderson, Richard Dudman, James R. Polk, David E.
Rosenbaum, and Knight Newspapers. Id. at 1036. See note 65 infra.
12. This' phrase was first used by Chief Justice Stone in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608
(1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting), rev'd per curiam, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). Since then, the Court
has repeatedly maintained this position in its first amendment decisions. See, e.g., Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958).
13. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957). See also cases cited note 12 supra.
14. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 545 (1963), citing
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1957); See Freedom v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
15. The Court has stated that the first amendment "must be taken as a command of the
broadest scope." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). See Lamont v. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248-50
(1936).
16. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
24 (1971).
17. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544-46 (1963);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24
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The test for constitutionality promulgated by early Supreme Court decisions required the balancing of the respective interests involved in each particular case, 1 8 and governmental interference was justified only upon a showing of an immediate, substantial, and compelling state interest. 19 In the
subpoena context, the Court additionally demanded that the government
demonstrate a substantial nexus between the information sought and the
overriding government interest.20 Once a compelling state interest was established, the government then had to demonstrate that it had exercised the
"least drastic means" to accomplish that legitimate state interest. 21 Furthermore, these criteria had been applied to direct encroachments on first
amendment rights as well as to the "chilling effects" 22 of indirect infringe23
ments.
(1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126-27 (1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 520-21 (1958).
18. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959). See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 520 (1958).
19. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
20. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963). The Gibson Court maintained "that it is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation
which intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, association and
petition that the State convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought
and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest." Id.
21. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US. 479 (1960). In Shelton, the Court stated that "[in a
series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Id. at 488 (footnote omitted).
See In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
22. The "chilling effect" concept, referring to the probable deterrence or self-censorship
which would result from certain government action, has been given legal significance in a series
of first amendment decisions. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (invalidating
a licensing scheme for motion pictures because the procedural hurdles imposed upon potential
licensees might deter them from showing protected films); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960) (invalidating a statute requiring teachers to list their organizational affiliations so that
officials could determine their competence); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)
(refusing to permit tax officials to compel disclosure of NAACP membership lists).
The Court has not, however, specified the standard of proof it requires before it will
acknowledge an indirect violation of a first amendment right-that is, an impermissible chilling
effect. For cases where it has recognized a chilling effect based on inference in the absence of
direct supporting evidence, see, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (invalidation of a state libel law which deterred persons from speaking through the press and dissuaded the press from publishing their statements); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)
(reversal of a conviction for violation of a law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous handbills); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (invalidation of an ordinance making a book seller
criminally liable for possession of obscene books, even if he had no knowledge of the contents of
the books, as the threat of such strict liability would cause him to sell only those books which
he has inspected); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (invalidation of a state tax law requiring the taxpayer to submit an affidavit of noncommunist affiliation prior to receiving an exemption; the Court held that such procedural hurdles would cause taxpayers to curtail their political
activity). The Court has at times recognized a chilling effect based on testimony in the record.
See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (invalidation of an ordinance requiring the
filing of an NAACP membership list for public inspection; the Court based its decision on
testimony given at trial that some NAACP members had not renewed their memberships because they feared community hostility and economic reprisals). However, the Court has also
dismissed such testimony as being speculative and self-serving. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972) (refusal of a testimonial privilege for journalists in a grand jury context).
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Recently, the Court's application of these tests has been affected by an
emerging theory of freedom of the press 24 which apparently offers institutional first amendment protection to members of the news media. 25 The
two principles underlying this development are an independence of the
press from government and a distinction between freedom of speech and
freedom of the press. 26 Specifically, the first principle dictates a rule of
neutrality whereby government action which confers special benefits or burdens on the press is disfavored, 27 while the latter concept recognizes a press
interest in the gathering of information. 28 Although this approach seems to

In the news gathering context, the "chilling" or deterence argument is relevant in two
related areas. First, journalists contend that if they are compelled to identify their sources,
informants will no longer furnish information. Second, it is argued that journalists may practice
self-censorship by not reporting all the news for fear of being compelled to identify their
sources. Note, The Right of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1505, 1530 (1974). See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972).
23. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Louisiana
v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
24. See Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977). According to
Professor Bezanson, this theory "departs significantly from the principles of decision that have
applied under the free speech clause. The concept is derived from explicit statements of the
Supreme Court and from implicit premises underlying the recent Court decisions in this area."
Id. at 785. For a discussion of the effect of these recent decisions on the Court's application of
the first amendment tests, see note 29 infra.
25. See Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINcS L.J. 631 (1975). Justice Stewart stated:
It seems to me that the Court's approach to all these cases has uniformly reflected its
understanding that the Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of the
Constitution .. . . [T]he Free Press Clause extends protection to an institution. The publishing business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit
constitutional protection.
Id. at 633 (emphasis in original). See also Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1975), wherein the author explained
that "[t]he special role of the press is to provide citizens with the information necessary to make
decisions about public policies and public officials. . . . Its role as collector, as well as disseminator, of the information necessary for effective self-government qualifies the press, as an
institution, for first amendment protection." Id, at 175. See also Bezanson, supra note 24, at
752-53.
26. See Bezanson, supra note 24, at 732. See generally notes 27 & 28 infra.
27. See Bezanson, supra note 24, at 733-34. An independent press requires neutrality since
any privileges or burdens directed solely toward the press would constitute special treatment,
thereby undermining the press' institutional independence guaranteed by the first amendment's
freedom of the press clause. Id. at 753. The conferral of special benefits on the press could
serve to compromise its independence since its members, fearful of a withdrawal of such privileges or out of a sense of obligation, might begin to act symbiotically by performing less than
full investigative and reporting functions relating to government activity. Id. at 755, 761. See
also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
The Court in Saxbe, finding the case "constitutionally indistinguishable from Pell v. Procunier,"
validated a policy prohibiting personal interviews between newsmen and individually designated
inmates. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 850. The Court held that "[t]he proposition
'that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally . . . finds no
support in the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court.' " Id., quoting Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974).
28. See Bezanson, supra note 24, at 733. A review of Supreme Court cases in the first
amendment area reveals that the Court has in the past seldom distinguished between freedom
of speech and freedom of the press. See Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 838, 840-41 (1971). Although most of the rights recognized by the Court as
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provide guidelines for the equitable resolution of disputes, conflicts have
arisen when the Supreme Court has inflexibly applied one of these principles, particularly when it has been reviewing the purported right to gather
news.

29

extending to the press under the Constitution can be derived from the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and association-for example, the right to publish without prior
restraint corresponds to the right to be free from restrictions on speech; press anonymity is the
written counterpart of associational privacy; and the rights of circulation, distribution and reception of information appear to be equivalent to notions of freedom of assembly-the interpretation of "freedom of the press as a particularized version of free speech omits an informationgathering element." Comment, supra note 25, at 173-75.
Yet, the Court has suggested that there may exist an as yet undefined "right" to gather
information, offering news gathering some degree of first amendment protection. See Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974) (news gathering has some first amendment protection;
journalists are free to seek out sources of information not available to members of the general
public) (dictum); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 707 (1972) (news gathering is entitled
to first amendment protection, for without such safeguards freedom of the press would be eviscerated) (dictum). Having never determined the scope of the purported right to gather news,
however, the Court has apparently limited any such privilege by denying journalists a special
right of access to government controlled information not available to the general public. See
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (the Court never intimated a first amendment
guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government control); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (the Constitution does not require the government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the general public);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (the first amendment does not guarantee the
press a constitutional right of access to information not available to the public generally).
For general discussions of the nature and scope of the media's right to gather news, see
Note, supra note 22; Comment, Newsgathering: Second Class Right Among First Amendment
Freedoms, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1440 (1975); Comment, supra note 25.
29. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). In his dissenting opinion in
Saxbe, Justice Powell noted the conflict arising from the recognition of a separate freedom of
the press-which necessitates the recognition of distinct press rights-and the simultaneous
application of a blanket rule of neutrality, which appears to preclude such special privileges. Id.
at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting). In addition, it has been recognized that the application of a
blanket rule of neutrality precludes any balancing of interests in regard to press claims of first
amendment protection. See Comment, supra note 28, at 1450-51.
Looking towards the resolution of such a conflict, Justice Stewart, the advocate of the press'
"Fourth Estate" function-where the media is to monitor governmental activity and thereby
protect against governmental abuses-recently recommended a practical and more flexible application of the neutrality principle in order to promote doctrinal harmony. See Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart maintained
that rights recognized as extending to journalists under the freedom of the press clause are not
necessarily special privileges, but rather are necessary accommodations. He stated:
I believe that the concept of equal access must be accorded more flexibility in order to
accommodate the practical distinctions between the press and the general public.
That the first amendment speaks separately of freedom of the press is no constitutional accident, but an acknowledgement of the critical role played by the press in American society. The Constitution requires sensitivity to that role, and to the special needs of
the press in performing it effectively.
• . . In short, terms of access that are reasonably imposed on individual members of
the public may, if they impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to the general public what
the visitors see.
Id. For a general discussion concerning the nonneutral accommodation of the press, see Bezanson, supra note 24, at 765-71.
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An illustration of such a conflict appeared in Branzburg v. Hayes, 30
where the Supreme Court suggested in dictum that there may exist a qualified privilege to gather news, 31 yet declined to recognize a constitutional
right allowing newsmen to refuse to identify their confidential sources before
a grand jury. 32 By asserting that the only issue presented was "the obliga33
tion of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do,"
the plurality 34 reformulated the issue to remove any substantial first
amendment question. 35 The plurality thereby acknowledged the broad
scope of grand jury investigations 3 6 while seemingly disregarding established
37
principles of first amendment adjudication.
30. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Branzburg decision involved three separate cases in which
journalists refused to identify their sources to grand juries. Id. at 667-79. Specifically, newsman
Branzburg had written an article describing the operations of a Kentucky hashish factory, reporter Pappas was present at a Massachusetts Black Panthers headquarters as the group was
preparing for a police raid, and newsman Caldwell had gained the confidence of California Black
Panther leaders. Id. at 667-79.
31. Id. at 681.
32. Id. at 690-91. Arguing that news gathering is protected by the first amendment, the
reporters claimed that forced disclosure would inhibit news gathering by deterring sources from
furnishing information to newsmen. Id. at 679-80.
33. Id. at 681-82.
34. justice White wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he agreed with the reasoning of the majority only insofar as it applied to the
particular factual situations presented. Justices Douglas and Stewart each filed dissenting opinions. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in Justice Stewart's dissent.
35. Id. at 681-82. Justice White explained that
these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that the press
publish what it prefers to withhold .... The use of confidential sources by the press is
not forbidden or restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from any source by means
within the law. No attempt is made to require the press to publish its sources of information or indiscriminately to disclose them on request.
...Citizens generally are not constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas;
and neither the First Amendment nor any other consitutional provision protects the average citizen from disclosing to a grand jury information that he has received in confidence.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Court apparently emphasized the neutrality principle at the expense
of the journalists' press freedoms.
36. Id. at 687-88. Although the Court recognized that the powers of a grand jury are not
unlimited, it emphasized the public's "right to every man's evidence." Id., quoting United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
37. 408 U.S. at 690-91. Appearing to acknowledge first amendment interests, the Court
stated: "Grand juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas to motions to quash. We do
not expect courts will forget that grand juries must operate within the limits of the First
Amendment ..... Id. at 708. In thus resolving the issue, the Branzburg Court balanced the
general public interest in law enforcement and effective grand jury proceedings against the
public interest in news reporting. Id. at 690-91. The plurality, however, rejected the stringent
safeguards previously required before infringements on first amendment rights were to be permitted. Id. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion, criticized the Court for its application of a
simplistic balancing test and for its rejection of the first amendment interests in the case. 408
U.S. at 745-46 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Repudiating what he perceived as the Court's underlying rationales, justice Stewart stated:
No doubt the courts would be required to make some delicate judgments in working out
this accommodation. But that, after all, is the function of courts of law. Better such judgments, however difficult, than the simplistic and stultifying absolutism adopted by the
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Since Branzburg, the Court has continued to emphasize the neutrality
principle at the expense of an unrestricted guarantee of freedom of the
press. 38 With regard to the claimed right of access, 39 the Court has maintained its position in Branzburg that "the First Amendment does not
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally." 4 0 Moreover, in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily,4 ' the Court recently determined that there was no constitutional violation in allowing police to search newspaper offices for information relevant
to a crime, even if the information was related to the criminal activity of a
third party.4 2 Nevertheless, in these decisions, the Court has emphasized
the availability of judicial review as a safeguard against the violation of first
amendment guarantees. 43 The Court, however, has established a confusing
precedent which has resulted in a number of divergent opinions in the lower
4
courts. "

Court in denying any force to the First Amendment in these cases .... [T]he interests
protected by the First Amendment are not antagonistic to the administration of justice.
Rather, they can, in the long run, only be complementary, and for that reason must be
given great "breathing space."
Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted). Acknowledging the previously established first amendment safeguards, Justice Stewart set out a tripartite test which he
believed incorporated those protections in the grand jury context.
He explained:
[W]hen a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and reveal confidences, I would
hold that the government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the
newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2)
demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding
interest in the information.
Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
38. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 675-76 n.5 (1978).
39. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829-31 (1974). In Pell, the
Court maintained that the press enjoyed no greater right to acquire information about prison
conditions than does the general public. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 833-34.
40. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978), quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 684 (1972).
41. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
42. Id. at 565-66. Specifically, the Court stated:
Nor are we convinced anymore than we were in Branzburg v. Hayes . . .that confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress news because of fears of warranted searches. Whatever incremental effect there may be in this regard if search warrants, as well as subpoenas, are permissible in proper circumstances, it does not make a
constitutional difference in our judgment.
Id. at 566 (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 565-66. As the Court explained in Stanford Daily:
[T]he prior cases do no more than insist that the courts apply the warrant requirements
with particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the
search .... Properly, administered, the preconditions for a warrant-probable cause,
specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and
overall reasonableness-should afford sufficient protection against the harms that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices.
Id. For a discussion of judicial intervention as a safeguard against the violation of first amendment guarantees in the grand jury context, see note 37 supra.
44. The Branzburg opinion has been interpreted, applied, and distinguished in a variety of
ways and in many divergent factual situations, with several courts focusing on the criminal/civil
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Confronted with these emerging limitations upon the freedom of the
press, the D.C. Circuit distinguished two first amendment claims in order to
resolve the questions presented in Reporters' Committee. 45 Specifically, the
subpoenas and bad faith subcourt bifurcated its analysis between good faith 47
poenas 46 and dealt with each issue separately.
Initially, although the court acknowledged the journalists' "so-called"
right to gather information, 48 Judge Wilkey relied on Branzburg to determine that news reporters had no special first amendment right to maintain
the secrecy of their sources when confronted with a good faith felony inves-

or grand jury/nongrand jury dichotomies. Many courts subsequent to Branzburg have denied
testimonial privileges to reporters in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Liddy,
354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972) (requiring a newspaper to produce confidential evidentiary
material in its possession relevant to a criminal trial); Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294
A2d 149, aff'd per curiam, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973)
(requiring reporter's disclosure to a grand jury of the name of a criminal he had observed). In
contrast, other courts have recognized a testimonial protection in criminal contexts. See, e.g.,
Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that grand jury questions were
only vaguely related to conduct that might have criminal consequences); Vermont v. St. Peter,
132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974) (noting failure of interrogator in a criminal deposition proceeding to show need for information and lack of alternative sources). Most courts have been more
protective of confidential source relationships in regard to civil matters. See, e.g., Baker v. F &
F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973) (court concluded that in
civil cases the public interest in nondisclosure will be greater than the private interest in compelled disclosure); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (public interest in
nondisclosure of journalist's confidential sources outweighs the public and private interest in
compelled disclosure). Cf. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.D.C. 1974) (reporter required to
disclose sources in libel suit since plaintiff's claim did not appear frivolous, knowledge of the
confidential sources appeared to go to the heart of the claim, and alternatives to compelled
disclosure would impose an onerous burden on the plaintiff).
Additionally, the tendency of post-Branzburg decisions has been to adopt a case-by-case
balancing approach. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 966 (1973); United States v. Orsini, 424 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mere.,
559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1977); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y.
1975). This approach has often been supplemented by the tripartite test suggested by Justice
Stewart in his dissent in Branzburg. See Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing
Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 715-18 (1975); note 37 supra. See also
Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972) (grand jury questions only vaguely
related to criminal conduct); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C.
1973) (failure of parties in a civil action to demonstrate relevance of testimony); Vermont v. St.
Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974) (failure of interrogator in a criminal deposition proceeding to show need for information and lack of alternative sources).
45. 593 F.2d at 1046.
46. Id. at 1046-47. The majority interpreted the good faith claim to require judicial balancing before such records are released to government officials in order to allow for a determination of whether the claimed first amendment infringement was justifiable. Id. It construed the
bad faith claim to necessitate judicial screening prior to the release of the records so that journalists would be protected from such blatant first amendment infringements in the future. Id. at
1047. According to the Reporters' Committee majority, this distinction was compelled by the
Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg, in which the Court recognized that challenges to good
faith subpoenas and bad faith subpoenas "pose wholly different issues for resolution." Id., quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). In addition, the majority rebuked both the
plaintiffs and the dissent for not grasping the significance of this bifurcated analysis. 593 F.2d at
1047-48.
47. Id. at 1047.
48. Id. at 1051.
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Accordingly, the majority maintained that Branzburg affirmed

the proposition that the right to gather information was "subject to the general and incidental burdens" that arise from good faith enforcement of laws
not expressly aimed at curtailing the free flow of information. 50

Further-

51
more, while some laws may produce unconstitutional indirect restraints,

Judge Wilkey required proof of the "present or future exercise, or

threatened exercise, of coercive power" 52 to establish that the indirect restraint created an impermissible "chilling effect" upon journalists. 53 Without such a demonstration, the Reporters' Committee court concluded that

the inspection of toll call records did not impermissibly abridge news gather54

ing activities.
In addition, the majority rejected plaintiffs' contention that a case-bycase balancing test was required whenever the government sought access to

toll call records during the course of a good faith felony investigation. 55 Relying again on Branzburg,56 the D.C. Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
49. Id. at 1050. The majority construed the plaintiffs' claim as contending that "journalists
have the unprecedented privilege of suppressing the records and testimony of third parties to
whom they and their sources have carelessly revealed incriminating information." Id. at 1049.
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that since Branzburg disallowed resistance to
good faith subpoenas ad testificanduin directed to the journalists, it was "logically inescapable"
that the journalists lacked the right to resist good faith subpoenas duces tecum directed at a
third party's business records. Id. at 1050. The court also noted an irony in the plaintiffs' reliance on Branzburg-thatdecision held that third party sources of evidence should be sought
prior to compelling the testimony of the particular journalists. Id.
50. Id. at 1051 (emphasis supplied by the court). Judge Wilkey emphasized the importance
of government investigation to the security of all liberties, and thus deemed the toll record
subpoenas to be a permissible burden on news gathering activity. Id. at 1051. Accordingly, the
court reasoned that since the first amendment does not guarantee freedom from such investigation, the inspection of the records did not constitute an infringement of that provision. Id. at
1051-52.
51. Id. at 1052, citing Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (prohibiting a state bar
committee from inquiring into political beliefs and affiliations of applicants to the state bar since
such activities were not relevant to professional competency); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967) (requisite teacher loyalty oaths declared violative of first amendment since
mere knowing membership is not a constitutionally adequate basis for imposing sanctions);
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (statute requiring addressee of foreign communist political literature to notify post office if delivery was desired held to be an unconstitutional infringement of first amendment rights).
52. 593 F.2d at 1052 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. For a discussion of the "'chilling effect" argument and cases in which the Supreme
Court has relied on this theory to invalidate state action, see note 22 and accompanying text

supra.
54. 593 F.2d at 1052. The majority did not limit its holding to the toll call records specifically at issue in Reporters' Committee, but rather indicated that its reasoning applied generally
to the subpoenaing of records in the hands of third parties. Id. at 1048. Although the plaintiffs
had not framed their objection to the subpoenas this broadly, the court nevertheless expanded
the scope of the inquiry to include other documents. Id. at 1053.
55. Id. at 1063. See also id. at 1060, citing Brief for Appellants at 28-33, Reporters' Comm.
for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
56. 593 F.2d at 1062. The majority framed the issue as being "whether the public interest
in ensuring the effectiveness of good faith felony investigations is sufficient to override the
burden on newsgathering which is said to result from permitting Government inspection of
toll-call records which might disclose the identity of journalists' secret sources." Id. The D.C.
Circuit concluded that the resolution of this issue was controlled by Branzburg, which it perceived as balancing "virtually identical" interest. Id.
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had balanced the relevant competing interests just once, indicating that the
constitutionality of good faith subpoenas could definitively be decided, and,
more significantly, had concluded that the government's interests in good
faith criminal investigations always overrode the journalist's interests in preserving the confidentiality of his sources.5 7 Moreover, the court determined
that the burden placed upon the journalists in the present case was less
onerous than that in Branzburg.58 Since Branzburg indicated a conclusive
balance in favor of law enforcement interests 5 9 which, according to the D.C.
Circuit, obviated the need for case-by-case balancing, 60 Judge Wilkey concluded that prior notice to journalists of good faith subpoenas was unneces61

sary.

With regard to subpoenas issued in bad faith, the majority recognized
that investigations conducted to harass journalists in their professional activities would violate the journalists' first amendment rights. 62 The court,
however, refused to grant the relief requested by the plaintiffs, which would
require judicial screening of all toll call record subpoenas before the records
are released. 63 The majority reasoned that "lilt is fundamental that in order
to obtain the kind of equitable relief sought in this case, plaintiff 'must show
not only that there is an imminent threat of harm but also that the
threatened harm is irreparable.'" 64 Absent this showing of a clear and
imminent threat of future governmental misconduct, the court was unable to
65
exercise its equitable powers on behalf of plaintiffs.
57. id. at 1061-62.
58. Id. at 1062. The majority reasoned that despite the fact that a journalist took every
secrecy precaution" and was "as discrete as possible," he could still be "directly compelled to
disclose" his confidential sources at a grand jury proceeding. Id. (emphasis supplied by the
court). In contrast, in regard to toll call record inspections, the use of these precautions would
enable the journalist, with only slight inconvenience, to avoid detection. Id.
59. Id., construing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
60. 593 F.2d at 1063.
61. Id. The majority maintained that prior notice was merely a procedural device the sole
function of which was to enable the journalist to trigger judicial supervision and balancing before the release of the subpoenaed records. Id. at 1048. Accordingly, the determination that
future balancing was unnecessary within the context of a good faith felony investigation undermined the plaintiffs' claimed need for prior notice. See note 50 supra.
62. 593 F.2d at 1064. The court reasoned that the first amendment protects information
gathering activities from governmental harassment and noted that such abusive action was particularly burdensome to news gatherers because it obstructed a reporter's ability to investigate
newsworthy activity. Id. The majority concluded that Branzburg specifically recognized first
amendment protection from such abusive conduct. Id., citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 707-08 (1972).
63. 593 F.2d at 1064. Characterizing the plaintiffs' request for relief as an "ongoing judicial
audit of future government investigations," the court viewed the claim as "extraordinary" in
light of the improbability of abuse. Id.
64. Id. at 1065, citing 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 9 (1972) (emphasis supplied by the court)
(footnote omitted). The court announced a three-prong test for when anticipatory relief would
be justified, requiring each individual plaintiff to show "(1) that there is an imminent threat that
the Government will subpoena his toll records in bad faith, (2) that such subpoena will cause
him substantial and irreparableharm, and (3) that his remedy at law is inadequate." 593 F.2d
at 1065 (emphasis supplied by the court).
65. Id. at 1066. The court affirmed the district court's granting of the defendants' motion for
summary judgment with respect to 10 of the plaintiffs since it was unable to grant prospective
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In a dissenting opinion Chief Judge Wright rejected the majority's expansive treatment of plaintiff's claim 66 and vehemently criticized its superficial analysis of Branzburg and Stanford Daily. 67 After noting that
Branzburg "explicitly recognized" the first amendment protection for news
gathering, 68 Chief Judge Wright argued that the source disclosure required
in Branzburg was of limited application. 69 The dissent contended that prior
judicial scrutiny on a case-by-case basis has long been recognized as a fun-

relief to those who had failed to adduce any evidence from which it could be inferred that their
toll call records had ever been subpoenaed in bad faith in the past. Id. Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the remaining plaintiffs-Jack Anderson, Richard Dudman, James R.
Polk, David E. Rosenbaum, and Knight Newspapers-the court determined that the inference
of possible abuse of subpoena power by the government was sufficient to withstand the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's
decision with respect to these journalists and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings. Id. The court instructed that
[i]f on remand the District Court finds no record of past abuse, and no other basis to
anticipate impending future misconduct, then plaintiffs will have failed on their claim for
equitable relief. If, however, the District Court finds that there has been a pattern of
abuse in the past, then the appropriate judicial response must be determined at that
time.
Id. at 1066-67.
66. Id. at 1082-83. (Wright, C.J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
In evaluating this claim I must begin by pointing out what is not involved here.
First, this is not a case in which we are called upon to hold that journalists enjoy protection against certain forms of governmental action above and beyond other citizens ...
Nor is this a case which requires us to establish new standards for balancing individual
and governmental interests or to decide whether disclosure of toll billing records is justified in any particular case.
. . . The issues which this case does present are twofold: whether appellants possess
any First Amendment interest which is threatened by disclosure of their toll billing
records to the Government and, if so, whether they are entitled to an opportunity for
prior judicial supervision on a case-by-case basis to safeguard that interest.
Id. (footnote omitted). Similarly, Judge Robinson submitted a concurring opinion which was
limited to a discussion of what he considered to be the "decisive elements in the case." Id. at
1071 (Robinson, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1079-80, 1085 n.17, 1094-96 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1083. (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1083-84. (Wright, C.J., dissenting), citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
699-700, 707-08 (1972). Chief Judge Wright noted Justice White s express limitation of the
Court's holding in Branzburg to grand jury subpoenas. 593 F.2d at 1083-84 (Wright, C.J.,
dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent quoted Justice Powell's reiteration of this limitation in
Branzburg, noting that Justice Powell stated: "[T]he Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the
gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources." Id. at 1084 (Wright, C.J., dissenting), quoting
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
Chief Judge Wright noted several distinctions between the situation presented in Reporters' Committee and that presented in Branzburg. First, release of toll call records causes
the "wholesale disclosure of names" of those relevant to the investigation as well as those not
relevant, whereas grand jury questions tend to be narrow and restricted to a particular crime.
593 F.2d at 1085 (Wright, C.J., dissenting), quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700
(1972). In addition, in the toll record situation, the journalist has no opportunity to quash the
subpoena since government summonses are issued without any form of judicial participation and
without prior notice to the journalist. 593 F.2d at 1087 (Wright, C.J., dissenting). In contrast, in
a grand jury situation, Chief Judge Wright noted that a journalist is afforded an opportunity to
challenge the disclosure before the court since, in that context, the journalist is subpoenaed to
testify directly or to produce records in his possession. Id.
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damental element of first amendment freedoms, 70 and had been substantiated by both Branzburg and Stanford Daily. 71 The dissent thus asserted that the absence of judicial participation in the issuance of government subpoenas, 72 combined with defendants' failure to notify plaintiffs of
the government's request 73 deprived the journalists of an opportunity to
74
protest in a judicial forum.
Moreover, in determining the requisite procedural protections, the dissent applied a balancing test 7 5 and concluded that judicial scrutiny was
necessary. 76 While according substantial weight to the pertinent governmental interests, 77 Chief Judge Wright recognized the judicially imposed
limitations on investigative techniques and reflected them in his balancing
test. 78 In concluding that the majority had failed to provide adequate assurances against the unconstitutional issuance of subpoenas 79 Chief Judge
Wright contended that a case-by-case analysis was required in order to protect against bad faith and overbroad subpoenas. 80
Although the majority attempted to examine and resolve the pertinent
constitutional questions presented in Reporters' Committee, it is submitted
that the D.C. Circuit inaccurately interpreted precedent, particularly the
scope of the Branzburg decision. Considering the obscure nature of that
decision, 8 1 it is still difficult to support the majority's construction of

70, 593 F.2d at 1088 (Wright, C.J., dissenting). See notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text
supra.
71. 593 F.2d at 1079-80 (Wright, C.J., dissenting), construing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
72. 593 F.2d at 1087 (Wright, C.J., dissenting). To highlight the extent to which this problem might proceed, Chief Judge Wright listed 47 governmental agencies which possess the
authority to request and obtain toll call records without any form of judicial control. Id. at 1086
n.18 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
73. See note 9 supra.
74. 593 F.2d at 1087 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1089-93 (Wright, C.J., dissenting). Applying the traditional balancing test derived
from prior Supreme Court opinions, the dissent specifically considered the scope of the intrusion on first amendment guarantees as well as the legitimate interests of government in avoiding
the costs which might accompany the imposition of procedural safeguards. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1091 (Wright, C.J., dissenting). Chief judge Wright, while arguing for prior judicial scrutiny in all cases where there would be a substantial infringement of first amendment
rights, did not assert that governmental intrusions were never justified. Rather, he recognized
the significant interest of the government, especially in the criminal context, when he stated:
[I]n striking a First Amendment balance the legitimate needs and interests of Government investigators must clearly be accorded substantial weight. This is particularly
true where, as in at least some of the cases of Government demands for toll records, the
Government is conducting investigations of criminal felonies.
Id.
78. Id. at 1091-92 (Wright, C.J., dissenting). See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
79. 593 F.2d at 1096 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
80. Id. (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
81. For a discussion of Branzburg, see notes 30-37 and accompanying text supra. Branzburg
does not provide much guidance for the conclusive resolution of the difficult constitutional questions that arise in this area of the law. The lack of predictability can be attributed to the
divergent opinions submitted by the various Justices in that case. See note 34 supra.
Justices Powell, Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall favored a qualified reporters' privilege for
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Branzburg8 2 as granting unquestioned authority to conduct good faith criminal investigations without any judicial supervision. Rather than approving
such a result, the numerous opinions submitted in Branzburg suggest that
some type of case-by-case balancing procedure is required to comply "with
83
the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions."
It is further submitted that the Reporters' Committee court assumed,
without support, that a balancing of interests would be unnecessary and
would therefore eliminate the need for prior notice of good faith subpoenas.
In making such an assumption, the majority apparently accepted the notion
that a valid justification for infringement of first amendment guarantees
eliminates the need for judicial intervention.8 4 Such a conclusion indicates a fundamental misconception of the role of judicial supervision and is
clearly contrary to the Supreme Court mandate that a valid infringement of
first amendment rights be the least drastic means available.8 5
The court's insensitivity to first amendment rights is further illustrated
by its failure to discern that the wholesale release of toll call records is more
86
onerous to the free press than are narrowly tailored grand jury questions.
The dissent aptly observed that Branzburg and Stanford Daily turned on
the availability of judicial supervision in both the grand jury and search warrant contexts, 8 7 while in Reporters' Committee no such supervision was available. 8 8 Instead of recognizing this crucial distinction, the majority ig-

safeguarding confidential sources. 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 743
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Douglas, while advocating an absolute reporter's
privilege to withhold the identity of confidential sources, would have created a majority of five
Justices who favored at least a qualified first amendment privilege for reporters. Id. at 713-14,
722 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Although justice Powell did not indicate the scope of the privilege which he would have
accorded the journalists, one commentator has made the following observation:
[Tihe rule of a numerical majority of the justices in Branzburg v. Hayes can therefore be said narrowly to be that reporters have a qualified testimonial privilege, dependent on a showing by the newsman that (a) the testimony would be irrelevant, (b) the
testimony would further no compelling state interest (e.g., when the testimony is sought
for purposes of harrassment, not in good faith, or not for a legitimate purpose of law
enforcement), or (c) the testimony is not required by other unspecified forms of balancing
(e.g., exhaustion of alternative sources).
Goodale, supra note 44, at 718.
82. See notes 49-50 & 56-61 and accompanying text supra.
83. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). See note 81
supra.
84. 593 F.2d at 1070. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 21 and accompanying text supra. The plaintiffs' position in Reporters' Committee was in accord with this mandate. The plaintiffs did not claim an absolute right to quash toll
record subpoenas, as the majority would appear to suggest. Rather, the journalists claimed a
right to obtain judicial supervision over the constitutional validity of these subpoenas through
the three-part balancing, relevance, and narrowness test. 593 F.2d at 1079 (Wright, C.J., dissenting). See notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 69 supra. See also note 72 supra. For the majority's position on this issue, see
note 58 supra.
87. See notes 69-74 and accompanying text supra.
88. 593 F.2d at 1089 (Wright, C.J., dissenting).
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nored Justice White's admonition that "[w]e do not expect courts will forget
that grand juries must operate within the limits of the First Amendment." 89
By erroneously focusing on propitiously selected language contained in
ambiguous decisions of the Supreme Court,90 it is submitted that the D.C.
Circuit has sustained that confusion in Reporters' Committee. Judge Wilkey's
decision to extend the Branzburg analysis 9' into the toll call record situation
can only serve to augment the uncertainty for later courts. Furthermore, the
D.C. Circuit's adoption of the neutrality principle, coupled with its failure to
provide substantive directives, suggests that established first amendment
protections are only to be narrowly applied to the press. 92 More importantly, acceptance of the analysis adopted by the D.C. Circuit may result in
the application by future courts of an inflexible rule of first amendment adjudication, Until the Supreme Court develops guidelines which clearly address this constitutional question, results similar to Reporters' Committee are
inevitable.
Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Branzburg, the court
in Reporters' Committee denied relief to journalists claiming certain qualified
privileges from governmental investigation of their long distance telephone
records. 93 In adopting a blanket rule of neutrality, 94 however, the court has
unnecessarily restrained journalists in the exercise of their first amendment
freedoms. Additionally, the court has ignored the safeguards that have traditionally been upheld as a protection of First Amendment rights. 95 Until the
Supreme Court offers substantive clarifications in this area of the law, journalists may continue to be stripped of the freedoms which the first amendment confers.
Arthur B. Axelson

89. 408 U.S. at 708.
90. See notes 29 & 44 and accompanying text supra. An example of the inadequate guidance
provided by the Branzburg Court may be found in its general statement: "Nor is it suggested
that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 408 U.S. at 681.
91. See 593 F.2d at 1049; notes 49 & 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
92. For a dicussion of the scope of protection accorded the press in earlier Supreme Court
decisions, see notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 45-65 and accompanying text supra.
94. For a discussion of the neutrality principle, see notes 27 & 38-40 and accompanying text
supra.
95. See notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra.
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